As military conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East intensify—and as the actors involved grow to include a complex array of states, armed groups, and militias—diplomatic efforts to end these hostilities have repeatedly faltered. The region is now plagued by immense human suffering and catastrophic material and moral losses, pushing it to the edge of collapse.
The Middle Easts New War of Attrition
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Despite the operational and intelligence successes of Israel in Lebanon in September 2024, a troubling question hangs over the country: Who bears responsibility for the failure to anticipate the Oct. 7 Hamas assault that led also to the war in Lebanon and on other fronts? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his intelligence chiefs appear locked in a blame game, with each side offering conflicting accounts of whether warnings were issued and, if so, why they were not acted upon
Reading of the Week: Israels Oct. 7 early warning failure: Who is to blame?
Texas National Security Review
The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are making a ‘last gasp’ diplomatic push to secure a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas. Mediators say that the latest truce offer, which they hope to finalize in Cairo this week, ‘bridges’ several contentious details that had thwarted previous talks. At the time of writing, the prospects for the negotiations look bleak. The terms of the ceasefire have yet to be fully disclosed, but they appear to have veered from earlier frameworks offered in May and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2735.
The real schism in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks is about who decides Gazas future
Chatham House
For weeks, concerns over the risk of miscalculation or even intentional escalation between Israel and Hezbollah have dominated attention. Ramped up cross-border attacks between the two sides on Sunday, August 25 have left each side simultaneously claiming success “for now,” suggesting a much-feared larger conflagration may have been averted in the near term.
However, implications for longer-term risk and mutual deterrence, Iran’s calculations for escalation, and linkage to the still-elusive Gaza cease-fire remain uncertain.
Israel-Hezbollah Contained Escalation Halts Concern Over Broader Mideast War
United States Institute Of Peace
In recent months, as the United States has struggled to deter and degrade the Houthis, Yemen’s United Nations-recognized government has worked to dramatically increase economic pressure on the group. The economy, in particular revenue and liquidity, is the Houthis’ Achilles heel. This is where the group is most vulnerable, and this is exactly where the government in Aden is pressing.
This approach, however, also carries significant risks. In the short term, increasing economic pressure on the Houthis is likely to prompt them to reignite attacks on Saudi Arabia, while in the long term it could make reuniting Yemen into a single state all but impossible.
The Houthis Achilles Heel
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
A series of violent events over the past week have taken the Middle East closer to the brink of all-out war. The latest of these was the killing, on 31 July, of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas’s political wing and a high-level guest of the Iranian government, in the Iranian capital Tehran on the day of the new Iranian president’s inauguration
Reading of the Week: Staying the Guns of August: Avoiding All-out Regional War in the Middle East
International Crisis Group
The war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah has reached new levels of tension. As attacks penetrate deeper into one another’s territory and the rhetoric intensifies, both sides feel increasingly compelled to respond with greater force, resorting to dangerous exchanges of fire and psychological warfare tactics. Hezbollah demonstrates its ability to fly drones over Haifa undisturbed
Reading of the Week: Israel and Hezbollah Are Playing With Fire
Italian Institute for International Political Studies
On March 25, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2728, calling for an “immediate” cease-fire in Gaza. The motion’s passage came after weeks of back and forth and posturing among the UNSC’s permanent and rotating members
Reading of the Week: What Does the U.N. Cease-Fire Resolution Mean for the Israel-Gaza War?
United States Institute of Peace
The Houthi attacks on maritime traffic through the Red Sea have created a major global crisis driving up the price of shipping and pushing about 90 percent of container ships to opt for circumventing Africa instead of going through the Suez Canal.
China Sees an Opportunity in the Red Sea Crisis with the Houthis
Stimson
A key premise of this study is that transnational organized crimes (TOCs) violate core human rights norms, principles and values of regional and international human rights instruments, including the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This study examines the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ role and work in combating TOCs in Africa.
Reading of the Week: Understanding the African Commissions role in combating TOCs in Africa
ENACT
Internet connectivity between parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe suddenly slowed on February 24 when three undersea cables were damaged in the Red Sea. This caused “a significant impact on communication networks in the Middle East,” according to Hong Kong telecoms company HGC Global Communications. The Red Sea is a choke point for global maritime trade—a fact Yemen’s Houthi rebels have taken advantage of by targeting global shipping with missile attacks in recent months. But the sea is also an internet and telecommunications bottleneck. An estimated 90 percent of communications between Europe and Asia and 17 percent of global internet traffic traverse cables under the 14-mile-wide Bab al Mandab Strait.
Reading of the Week: Red Sea Cable Damage Reveals Soft Underbelly of Global Economy
Center for Strategic and International Studies
In the midst of the 12-week campaign by Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen to disrupt the critical shipping corridor of the Red Sea, a new worry is creeping in: that the Houthis may target the bevy of subsea cables that carry nearly all the data and financial communications between Europe and Asia
Reading of the Week: The Houthis Next Target May Be Underwater
Foreign Policy Magazine
For the first time in four decades, a core U.S. interest in the region on which successive American presidents have based U.S. Middle East policy - freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce - is increasingly at risk. By enabling the Houthis in Yemen to attack international vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with armed drones and sophisticated anti-ship missiles, Iran, as it did in the Gulf in the late 1980s, is causing tremendous harm to commercial activity in one of the world’s most crucial waterways.
Reading of the Week: A Strategy for Countering the Houthi Threat at Sea
Middle East Institute
Women’s experiences with certain post-conflict processes in the context of the Boko Haram crisis go beyond marginalization. Women are completely invisible. Though the traditional understandings of what it means to be a female and conventional expectations of women in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) have significantly evolved since Boko Haram, responses to the crises do not capture this evolution.
Reading of the Week: The experiences of women combatants in post-Boko Haram peace processes. A Discord Between Impact and Redress
Wilson Center
Tehran has previously been able to conduct a “hidden-hand operation” via the Houthis at a very low cost, but that price may now be set to rise if allied counter-strikes continue.
Irans Revolutionary Guard Deployed in Yemen
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
In the years after the 9/11 attacks, a new threat loomed large in the minds of policymakers and the public: the dirty bomb. This term describes a radiological weapon that used an explosive to disperse radioactive material over a limited area. A dirty bomb is far less powerful than a nuclear bomb, but it is easier and cheaper to assemble and can cause tremendous panic and disruption.
Why the World Should Still Worry About Dirty Bombs
Council On Foreign Relations
The toll of armed conflict is felt heavily across civilian populations, as infrastructure is destroyed, civilians are killed, and the very social fabric of communities is unraveled. Most combatants across contexts are men, and in most wars, battle-related injuries affect men disproportionately
Unraveling the Multi-Faceted Impact of Armed Conflict on Women in the Gaza Strip
Wilson Center
The group is using a wide range of weapons and tactics to escalate its disruption of regional maritime security, establishing selective sea denial against Israeli vessels seeking passage through the strait and threatening U.S. warships that show up to protect them
Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
So when Hassan Nasrallah, the head of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the most powerful non-state actor in the world, says that he doesn’t wish to broaden the war in Gaza to help his Palestinian ally Hamas, the region should breathe a sigh of relief – because his words matter.
The closer Israel gets to destroying Hamas, the more likely war with Hezbollah becomes
Chatham House
Initial reactions to Hamas’s October 7 bloody attack on Israelis and Israel’s declaration of war focused on the short term: how strongly would Israel react and what would its war aims be? It was precisely such short-term thinking—on the part of Israeli, Palestinian, American, and other leaders who sought to postpone rather than address issues—that contributed to the current crisis. Israel has finally spelled out war aims, but they are very ambitious: to oust Hamas from governance and to destroy its military capability. That new, yet limited, clarity has pushed public discussions and private, official meetings to begin arrangements for the day after.
There Might Be No Day After in Gaza
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
That is one of many questions that have arisen in the days since Hamas’ Oct. 7 incursion into Israel and attacks on Israeli forces and civilians. The absence of early warnings from data collected via sensors, cameras, and surveillance drones along the border’s “smart fence,” as well as the penetration of the Iron Dome missile defense system, has led to a sense that Israel experienced a tragic “high-tech failure.”
The October 7 Hamas attack: An Israeli overreliance on technology?
Middle East Institute
Since August 2022, the Somali federal government has engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign against al-Shabaab. Somali troops achieved some successes, including dislodging the militants from hundreds of locations previously under al-Shabaab’s control in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states in central Somalia. Clan militias and local power brokers provided active support to the counter-insurgency, sharing operational information with the government and giving legitimacy to government forces.
Somalia Al-Shabaab Strikes Back at Local Administrators
ACLED
Thus far, October’s exchanges of fire between Hizbollah and Israel have stayed within the sides’ red lines. Still, with an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza looming, risks are tremendous. A Gaza ceasefire, while improbable, is the only way to rule out a broader war.
Deterrence between Israel and Hizbollah Must Hold
International Crisis Group
On 7 October, Hamas carried out a massive assault on Israel, drawing immediate comparisons to the 1973 conflict, when the Egyptian and Syrian armies similarly breached Israeli defences. In this Q&A, Crisis Group lays out what happened and where the fighting may be headed.
A Second October War in Israel-Palestine
International Crisis Group
Over the years, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed as a tactic of terrorism has taken various forms, notably: forced recruitment; rape; forced marriage, pregnancy, and abortion; sexual slavery; and the use of women and girls to carry out suicide attacks. Numerous terrorist groups, including ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Ansar Eddine, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, are known to commit such crimes in the states where they operate. In 2016, an emerging focus on the linkages between terrorism and SGBV resulted in the UNSC’s affirmation that victims of sexual violence committed by terrorist groups should be recognised as victims of terrorism.
Time for a victim-centric approach in prosecuting sexual and gender-based violence committed by terrorists
International Center for Counter Terrorism
Motorbikes are one of the most widely trafficked commodities in the Sahel, deeply embedded in the Sahelian criminal economy. These trafficking networks are a crucial source for armed groups, particularly in the face of growing restrictions on trade.
Reading of the Week: Motorbikes and armed groups in the Sahel
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
On the morning of 22 May, 2023, an artificial intelligence (AI) generated image of an explosion at the Pentagon surfaced online and spread like wildfire throughout social media. Multiple news sources reported and shared the AI-generated image on their platforms. As a result, markets responded to the reports and image, and the S&P 500 index fell in just minutes after its reporting, causing a $500 billion market cap swing, even though this image was quickly proven as fake.
The Newest Weapon in Irregular Warfare. Artificial Intelligence
Irregular Warfare Center
Since 2006, “unspoken rules” have prevented tensions between Hizbollah and Israel from blowing up into large-scale conflict. But the mutual deterrence is fragile. In this video of our In Black & White series, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Lebanon, David Wood, explains how a misstep on one side could lead the other to respond forcefully.
Israeli-Hizbollah Mutual Deterrence Must Be Preserved
International Crisis Group
In June, to the surprise of most UN Security Council members, Mali’s government called on the Council to pull UN peacekeepers out of the country “without delay”. Some diplomats briefly considered options for keeping the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in place, but most greeted the news with a resignation verging on fatalism. Although the precise timing of Bamako’s demand was unexpected, the Malian government had been frank about its loss of trust in the UN.
What Future for UN Peacekeeping in Africa after Mali Shutters Its Mission?
International Crisis Group
The Freedom Theatre (TFT), headquartered in the Jenin Refugee Camp in the northern West Bank that was invaded once again by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) last week, is nothing if not a crucible for the Palestinian experience. Up against grinding poverty, occupation, religious extremism, and, more recently, aerial bombardment, the theater miraculously survives.
Jenins Freedom Theatre rises from the ashes once again
Middle East Institute
The characterization of Israeli control over Palestinians as an apartheid system represents a significant shift in the way the regime is portrayed and understood. While the application of the term to Israel has been around since the 1960s, traction has intensified over the past two decades, partly due to the emergence of an anti-apartheid movement and increasing recognition that Israel’s grip on Palestinian territory is permanent. Legal experts, scholars, human rights professionals, and multilateral institutions have all contributed to the growing body of research and analysis supporting the charge.
Apartheid and the Palestine Liberation Movement: Opportunities and Challenges
Middle East Council on Global Affairs
While the world’s attention is focused on Ukraine, Russia has been steadily expanding its presence in the Middle East, including through its dealings with the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbullah. Although much is still unknown about the full extent of their collaboration, U.S. sanctions designations have revealed a multifaceted and increasingly lucrative relationship that should not be ignored amid other crises.
Hizbullah and Russias Nascent Alliance
The Washington Institute For Near East Policy
Cracks in Israel’s deterrence against Hezbollah are evident following the terrorist attack at Megiddo Junction in mid-March 2023 by a Palestinian who crossed the border from Lebanon, and the rockets fired by Hamas from southern Lebanon into Israel during the month of Ramadan – compounded by the internal crisis in Israel.
Israel May Have to Change its Deterrence Equation with Hezbollah
The Institute for National Securitiy Studies
This paper uses a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model (DSDM) to study potential spatial spillover effects of terrorism on military spending. We show that terrorism in the home country as well as in neighboring countries lead to an increase in military spending (as % of general government expenditure) in the home country.We also find a strategic complementary in military spending decisions, as an increase in military spending in neighboring countries has a positive and significant effect on home military spending. As the effects of increased military spending on growth are likely to be negative, our results indicate that terrorism spillover or military spending complementarity can negatively impact a country’s growth, even in the absence of direct terrorist attacks.
Reading Of The Week: Terrorism and Military Expenditure in Africa An Analysis of Spillover Effects
African Development Bank Group
Kidnappings of nationals in Burkina Faso surged to record-breaking levels in 2021 and continued at this unprecedented scale throughout 2022. Non-state armed groups - including, most prominently, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known by its Arabic acronym JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin) - are central perpetrators. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), kidnappings have increased over 30-fold since 2017, when the security situation in Burkina Faso began to sharply deteriorate (rising from eight incidents in 2017 to 262 in 2021 and 219 in 2022).
Reading of the Week: The silent threat. Kidnappings in Burkina Faso
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
This report summarizes, and builds on, some of the author’s previous conceptual work. It approaches the definition of terrorism from five angles: (i) by focusing on the history of terrorism;(ii) by focusing on the psychology of ‘terror’ (the threat and fear factor); (iii) by focusing on forms of political violence other than terrorist violence; (iv) by focusing on the terrorist act; and (v) by focusing on the terrorist. Subsequently it addresses the question who should have definition power? The author looks at how terrorists, mass and social media, national governments, the United Nations, and members from academia have tried to define terrorism. In his conclusion, the author pleads for a narrow definition of terrorism. The main body of the text is followed by a sample of definitions of terrorism and a bibliography of books, book chapters, and articles on the subject.
Reading of the Week: Defining Terrorism
International Center for Counter Terrorism
Once allies in the same organization, Hayat Tahrir alSham (HTS) and the Islamic State have an interesting history that turned them into ‘frenemies’ from April 2013 to February 2014 and then outright enemies over the past nine years.This led to a broader global fight between alQa`ida and the Islamic State. Yet, HTS continued to tread its own path by breaking from al-Qa`ida in 2016. From the spring of 2014 to the summer of 2017, the main avenue by which HTS and its predecessor group, Jabhat al-Nusra, dealt with the Islamic State was insurgent infighting. Yet since the summer of 2017, as HTS consolidated control over areas in northwest Syria and developed a governance apparatus, HTS has favored a lawfare approach to dealing with Islamic State cells in the territory it controls.
Jihadi Counterterrorism: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Versus the Islamic State
The Washington Institute
The report provides background information and whenever available data about deserting and defecting pathways out of Al-Shabaab militant group. After distinguishing between the formal and the informal options, the report engages with the main challenges and consequences associated with them. Men, women, and children’s profiles, as well as forms of engagement with the group, are discussed as key determinants of potentially available pathways. Complementing this overview, which is based on research findings limited in scope and representativeness, the report relies on a pool of expert interviews which help shed some light on the unreported and underreported aspects of the issues at stake.
Somalia: Defection, desertion and disengagement from Al-Shabaab
European Country of Origin Information Network
On 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. Yet, it turned out to be the last major gasp of the aerial war between Riyadh and the Sanaa-based government that had started in 2015.
Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations.
Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran
Clingendael Institute
The Somali Islamist group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, commonly known as al-Shabaab, is the ‘largest, wealthiest and most deadly’ al-Qaeda affiliate remaining in the world. While its origins trace back to the early years of the 2000s, the group rose to prominence during the invasion and occupation of Somalia by the Ethiopian military between 2006 and 2009.
Terror and Taxes: Inside al-Shabaab revenue-collection machine
Global Initiative
Having waged deadly violence for over a decade, Boko Haram has survived various interventions by the Lake Chad Basin countries and their partners. The longevity of the group can, in part, be attributed to its continued access to resources. This report explores the economic drivers that reinforce Boko Haram’s resilience, including the key actors involved in these activities.
Reading of the Week Boko Harams deadly business. An economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin
Institute For Security Studies
The Islamic State group (IS) seems to have been reduced to a shadow of its former self. Public attention in the West has waned, and the priorities of the international community shifted to other issues. This warrants taking stock of the group's current status and assessing the dangers it still poses.
The State of the Islamic State
Center for Security Studies
The Islamic State group (IS) seems to have been reduced to a shadow of its former self. Public attention in the West has waned, and the priorities of the international community shifted to other issues. This warrants taking stock of the group's current status and assessing the dangers it still poses.
The State of the Islamic State
Center for Security Studies