



NATO Strategic Direction South Hub: “Who Funds Instability in Africa” Analysis

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— A Spark for Change —

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 17, 2018 The NATO Southern Hub (NSD-S) and Three Stones International held an online chat forum to discuss "Who funds Instability in Africa?" During the hour and a half long event, NSD-S personnel directly engaged with community and civil society leaders from 12 African countries, many working daily on the front lines in conflict and post-conflict settings. Regional and technical experts from NGOs and multilateral organizations and think tanks also joined.

Through this event, NSD-S was able to interact and hear unpolished perspectives from civil society organisations (CSO) and leaders that live and work in Africa. This opportunity enabled an exchange of ideas to better understand drivers of instability, primarily through a local lens, and how it may be possible to leverage civil society for soft power. It demonstrated a considerable willingness by both NATO and CSOs to seek creative ways to gain perspectives from community and civil society leaders in Africa.

Several participants had questions regarding NATO's intentions. Those questions are distilled to the following statement, "NATO is military, and we do not need military solutions to our challenges." The event allowed NSD-S personnel to address this type of statement directly by offering the explanation that the Hub has been developed as NATO's Article 2 organization and is working towards finding better ways to engage with people to gain something very important; their perspective.

Utilizing this *Grassroots Virtuality* platform was a first step to bring together local voices, context and perspectives that are, otherwise, not typically accessible to NATO. By continuing to leverage these voices, foster relationships and create allies with youth, women's groups, grassroots and religious leaders, and CSOs, NSD-S will be able to more effectively fulfill its mission to connect, consult and coordinate. These on the ground perspectives will support NSD-S to provide the best possible advice to NATO while building relationships that can ultimately lead to peace and stability—NATO Soft Power.

Key takeaways from the event:

- On the ground knowledge and the voices from the community can help NATO develop strategies for how to appropriately intervene.
- NATO must be open to contemplating who and what drives a community including the thought process occurring within a community.
- Addressing only the symptoms allows for the continuation of instability and makes people more dependent.
- Youth are not the problem, they are a solution.
- If on the ground information is provided directly to NATO, will there be observable action and change in policy.
- There is collaboration with ruling parties and high-ranking politicians. This can perpetuate instability and creates a never-ending cycle if local voices aren't included.
- Better understanding of the needs on the ground is necessary before bringing financial support.
- Just as religious groups can support/foment instability, so can they play a determinative role in helping resolve conflict.
- Illicit cash flows contribute to and connect criminality and instability.
- If leaders and decision-makers are not held accountable, a corrupt system will continue.
- International organizations are well positioned to stop instability. But, they cannot stop instability in the absence of commitment to peace, a holistic understanding of the context, and without buy-in from national and local actors.



INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one of the most violent regions in the world in terms of sustaining the most wartime deaths per decade, and these conflicts and their trajectories, trends, and impacts are critical to understand and mitigate in order to ensure economic growth, inclusive development and regional stability. Sub-national conflicts involving contending armed and communal groups have become a major concern in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Nigeria. The trajectory of conflict in SSA has had devastating economic and social impacts...Even in the absence of active conflicts, many SSA countries carry the social, physical and economic scars of violent struggles from the past as they seek to develop and grow... The fundamental nature of conflict has changed in the region towards increasingly intrastate-armed violence and the dividing line between armed conflict, organized crime and ideological extremist violence has become blurred. Unpacking the changing nature of violent conflict in the region is critical to understanding effective mechanisms to improve livelihoods and diminish the negative impacts of conflict on people and resources in SSA.

Given the current and changing nature of conflict in SSA, civil society leaders are often those most connected to communities affected by violent extremism, conflict, and strife. In many cases, what begins as community-level conflict – sometimes stoked by national level figures – can evolve into a sub-national, national or regional conflagration. Understanding local drivers of conflict and grievance, critical stakeholders and the means/methods of acting out violence are not only essential elements in attempting to prevent conflict, but also in seeking to mitigate its impacts.

“In 2000, 30 major conflicts, including 10 of the 23 civil wars taking place worldwide, were located in SSA. In 2014 there were more than 4,500 clashes between armed groups and more than 4,000 instances of armed violence against civilians.”¹ Armed conflict stripped African economies of an estimated \$18 billion per year between 1990 and 2005, or approximately the equivalent amount of international aid from major donors in the same time period.²

Fundamentally, conflict often revolves around power: power over resources, power over people, power over decision-making; power over wealth. As such, it is frequently those in power – government officials, drug kingpins, warlords – that might have the greatest incentive to promote conflict if they see it to preserve their vested interests. Civil society, then, can act as a powerful countervailing force, not only in understanding conflict dynamics, but also in mobilizing communities and society to confront those who are abusing power.

The majority of conflicts cannot be resolved by one single player. Engaging with as many civil society actors as possible – collecting and synthesizing their views, experiences, networks, and recommendations – could be a critical component to develop effective, holistic approaches to stabilization and conflict management for NATO’s soft power.

PROCESS

To assist NSD-S to achieve its goal to better connect allies, partners and non-military actors and build networks and relationships, Three Stones collaborated to design and implement an online chat event. On July 17, 2018, we performed a beta test using the overarching theme: “Who funds instability in Africa.” To host the event, we selected the off-the-shelf open source discussion exchange platform known as Kialo. This option allowed us to quickly initiate the event and cost-effectively test and consider what

Text box: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00mj39.pdf

¹ https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00mj39.pdf

² IANSA et al., 2007

features would be necessary for future NSD-S forums. Kialo, is an online tool used to engage discussion and help with collaborative decision-making. Using this platform required participants to vote between “Pros/Cons” and to provide comments on items on which they agreed or disagreed. This beta event used the overarching theme and ten sub-themes to orient the dialogue.

The goal of this event was to test and support NSD-S’ ability to build relationship, coordinate and synchronize efforts across the Global South; improve understanding of drivers of conflict and instability; and consider a cost-effective convening platform. We especially wanted to test the ability to access and gain perspectives of civil society by providing a nimble and communicative online platform for voices in Africa to be heard.

NSD-S sought the services of Three Stones to collaborate on the development of a model and approach for a cross sectorial and multi-institutional exchange of ideas and learning in the form of a virtual online chat forum. At first, the reach of the event would be limited to NSD-S Hub participants and a selection of organisations/civil society leaders. Given the rapid 10-day cycle from conception to launch the aspiration was to have minimum 15 participants engage.

In the five days leading up to the event, NATO provided ten names and Three Stones another 20 names. Collectively, it was a mix of multinational, think tanks and key civil society actors and organisations. After the Save the Date invitation was sent on July 12, the list organically grew through our combined network. Thus, we opted to expand the pool with the intention to test the premise of whether the platform would be acceptable in the eyes of civil society organisations and leaders and if this was viewed as a legitimate method in which to interact. Thus, another 49 people were included in the invite.

The Kialo platform went live at 8 am on July 17. To kick-off the event, NSD-S developed an introduction video and Three Stones launched a VIP speaker video of Jean de Dieu Alingwi, a community organizer and conflict resolution expert from DR Congo.

During the chat forum, community and civil society leaders from 12 African and 5 Western countries participated. Several NGOs and local and regional experts contributed as well. A total of 31 participants (not including NATO or Three Stones) commented from the following African countries: Burundi, Cameroon, DR Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe as well as experts from East Africa Regional. Thus, was launched: [Grassroots Virtuality](#).

THEMES

Overarching Theme

1. The funding of instability in Africa comes from various actors, each with their organisational or personal motivations. This instability works to their advantages, though not necessarily to the benefit of communities and society. Who are these actors and “who funds instability in Africa?”

Ten sub-themes

- 1.1 Civil society voices must be heard in order to decrease instability.
- 1.2 Development "industry" funds instability.
- 1.3 Youth can contribute to sustainability.
- 1.4 It is possible to measure instability at a country level.
- 1.5 Corporations fund instability.
- 1.6 Governments fund instability.
- 1.7. Religious groups fund instability.
- 1.8. Trafficking and cross-border criminality create instability in Africa.
- 1.9. The most rampant issue in many African countries, is the endemic corruption. Even in stable societies, it creates inability to invest, a real blockage to social promotion, and has severe effects on security and governance. In instable societies, corruption is often the norm, and both relief and development efforts are hampered by it. If IO's want to make meaningful contributions, we



must focus on supporting local leadership that shows real commitment to transparency and good governance.

1.10. International organisations (NATO, European Union, United Nations, African Union) are in the right position to stop instability.

KEY TAKEAWAYS BY SUB-THEME

Below is a rapid analysis of key takeaways with synthesized excerpts. The purpose is to highlight the participants' views and priorities under each of the ten sub-themes to capture the richness and diversity of perspectives shared.

1.1: Civil society voices must be heard in order to decrease instability

Many participants embraced the voice of CSOs to enable stability.³ It was stressed that **local civil society is located where crises are occurring, or potential crisis are about to occur**. As such, CSO and community leaders can help document and provide nuanced information about the situation on the ground. To complement media, intelligence reports, NGO analysis (Human Rights Watch/Amnesty etc.), and academics, this on the ground knowledge and the voices from the community can help inform NATO. This could enable better strategies for how to contextually and appropriately intervene.

Often, CSOs are uniquely positioned to promote dialogue and reconciliation and can be a legitimate voice able to establish mutual understanding and trust. These are both necessary to stabilize and transform conflict in fragile states. However, to improve success, participants are looking for better strategic support and confidence that NATO and other power holders are not working at cross purposes.

To predict instability and conflict, it is necessary to *speak the language*, understand the culture, and be open to authentic leaders and drivers of community thought, not only elected or influential officials. This means that **NATO and other actors must be open to contemplating who and what drives a community and the thought process occurring within a community**. As this [UN report](#) highlights, the engagement of members of civil society who are able to share the lived experience of the population, including women and youth, is necessary expand information availability. Currently, this is not the case and community voices critical for a holistic and accurate understanding is not reaching NATO.

Due to stature and alignment with nation states and actors, **NATO can address instances where free speech within a society had been diminished**. Wherever free speech is not permitted, it is difficult for CSOs to contribute to decreasing instability. Experience has shown that almost overnight, especially with the power of social media, civil society can spring up. CSOs can attract and hold a significantly large followership and maintain motivation towards positive change. There was perceived value in NATO supporting free speech. And, if doing so, NATO in turn would be better able to access these voices as a tool against instability.

Utilizing techniques such as a CSO managed healing process initiated by traditional leaders or elders has potential to resolve conflict and prevent future conflicts provided the conflict is not acute. It may be possible to identify a potential crisis and deploy techniques that have been tested by civil society ahead of an outbreak of violence. An example provide was to utilize lessons learned by civil society in the clan and sub-clan elders in Ethiopian Afar as well as Gacaca mediators/elders in Rwanda. Utilizing CSOs who have a realistic local view of what can be solved through mediation could reduce the need for hard power solutions by NATO.

³ It is noted that most of the participants were from CSOs

1.2 Development "industry" funds instability

The sentiment of the participants was that we cannot condemn the whole of an industry just because it is an industry and that it was not a root cause of instability in Africa. However, it was acknowledged that instability by development programs can happen inadvertently. For example, non-sustainable programs and program models that are not built within a complete understanding of incentives of direct and indirect stakeholders can be disruptive. Therefore, development models need to continue to improve especially in fragile or fluid environments. The industry can help to alleviate poverty and improve lives. But, the situation will remain the same as long as the interventions are only addressing symptoms as opposed to causes. A recent article in the [guardian](#) provides commentary on the instability caused by non-systems thinking.

Addressing only the symptoms allows for the continuation of instability and makes people more dependent on humanitarian or development aid. Thus, poorly designed and executed development assistance can exacerbate conflict and empower various stakeholders. For example, it was noted that in Ethiopia and Mali funds/food aid intended for emergencies was coopted/controlled by opposing sides in a conflict. Thus, greater consideration and safe guards are needed to improve on program design, implementation and preparation for emergency response.

1.3 Youth can contribute to sustainability

Because of their vulnerability (unemployment, lack of education, discrimination, etc.) young people can easily be manipulated by politicians. For them to be agents of change, it is important to address the reasons that are behind their participation in instability and acknowledge the proverb, "an empty stomach has no ears." It is critical to provide opportunities for the most disempowered, hard-to-reach and at-risk youth and not only rely on privileged youth.

Although an alarm has been sounded over the [youth bulge](#)⁴, **youth are not the problem, they are a solution**. History has shown how powerful young people can be to create change and contribute to sustainability. Empowering young people can deprives drivers of instability. Examples can be found in movements led by young people who rose up to fight against racial segregation in the US, apartheid in South Africa, dictatorship and brutal regime in Serbia, foreign occupation in Ukraine, etc. Grassroots-led actions, if well planned, organized and supported, can help resolve social injustices and problems related to governance and leadership. A [2015 study](#) from Mercy Corps determined that feelings of injustice were greater drivers for political violence amongst youth than economic status. In the light of the Arab Spring and other uprisings, NATO must be aware of perceptions and history of what allies represent within countries and the regimes they support based on political interests.

What is key for governments, especially in Africa, is to have a very well managed and inclusive civically sensitized youth who see equitable opportunities. It was stated that youth involvement in key government decisions, systems and innovative entrepreneurship activities is a way of preventing conflict. Governments need policies that consider the long-term transition of youth from school to meaningful employment. A country in East Africa stemmed youth unemployment by introducing an extensive graduate education program. The youth reached were satisfied for a time, but the effort ultimately failed as opportunities and the need for increased education did not match the job market within the country. If corresponding employment opportunities have not been created for educated youth, there is a risk of unemployed educated people either leaving the country, "brain drain," or becoming further dissatisfied, which can exasperate an already tenuous situation, especially with growing population pressures in Africa. Development partners have to consider "pathways for youth" and more comprehensive solutions.

1.4. It is possible to measure instability at a country level

It is possible to measure instability. But the greater question is, what are we doing with that information? A number of participants are monitoring trends in different countries and have a

⁴ <https://www.cfr.org/background/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts>

strong understanding and picture of potential scenarios and escalation points. But, they do not feel they are able to effectively share the information. More importantly, they do not feel action is taken based on the information that is shared or available. This is a sentiment echoed by many activists and CSOs. Reports of human rights violations and accurate, informed intelligence on the ground often does not affect decisions by UN, NATO, and other actors. Participants of the forum expect that **if on the ground information is provided directly to NATO that there will be observable action and change in policy**. Otherwise, participants are skeptical of NATO's commitment and might be less willing to share information in the future.

It was suggested by participants it is challenging to establish the baseline: how were things when they were "stable," and what does this mean for countries that have experienced protracted conflict over many decades? Specifically, in protracted crises, populations develop coping mechanisms that are continuously changing the baseline.

Participants felt that an index can be created that tracks the evolution of social, economic, political and military institutions over time against specific indicators. This will help observers flag the likelihood of disruption or catastrophic failure within the respective contexts. A stability index for each of the spheres would be instructive. For example, instability is characterized by several aspects that include but are not limited to: human rights violations, extra-judiciary killings, existence of armed groups, incapacity of government to restore its authority through the country, small arms trafficking, increase of criminality in urban areas and the political interference in the justice system. These can be referred to as indicators to determine or measure degrees of instability in a particular region. Considering the complex interrelationship amongst institutions, these indicators can also be useful to track stability or instability. It was stated that there have been many studies about measuring instability, but not many studies on joint efforts to measure effectiveness as we deal with instability. Is NATO willing to collaborate on a harmonized index?

1.5. Corporations fund instability

A participant noted, instability in Africa is profitable to corporations, namely on two levels: markets for their products that can include small arms and be sold illegally/legally, as well as high priced products which affect the local market and may have an impact on food security. In regions with mining resources, international corporations are especially influential on the outcome of conflicts and are, without question, the main instigators of instability. Often **there is collaboration with ruling parties and high-ranking politicians which perpetuates instability and creates a never-ending cycle** that allows the people in power to guarantee access to the corporations so that they can continue extracting the country's national resources. For example, in Democratic Republic of Congo, 80 local companies that have a relationship to global corporations are held by the [President's family](#). These businesses cause societal tension because there is no reporting on conduct given the inability to challenge the presidential family.

Africa alone is home to about 30% of the world's mineral reserves, 10% of the world's oil, and 8% of the world's natural gas.⁵ But, all too often these natural resources have become a source of conflict rather than opportunity. Lack of transparency, equality and concentrated wealth can drive instability, there are also examples of specific corporations driving conflict in some countries. It was noted, multinational companies seek profits often supported by their country of origin and the alliances they make with the African host country. [China](#) is a growing influence in Africa as is the well documented impact of extractive mining industries and their disruption to communities. From participant experience, extractive industries, simply by the massive revenue at stake, often align with central/national governments over indigenous groups where resources exist.

The failing of corporations is that, in terms of investibility, the foreign capital necessary for scaling up development and meeting the SDG goals is insufficient, even in stable countries. It takes time to change global perceptions about changes in risk and African markets cannot

⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview#1>

compete with multinational corporations who are only seeking profit and the most expedited way to strip Africa of her resources.

To counter this, corporations can bring meaningful jobs to the country or region. These can stimulate economic growth and provide hope and opportunities for youth. Corporations can work with universities to develop academic/training programs to help develop the work force in line with corporation needs and improved livelihoods for communities.

1.6. Governments fund instability

This was the most active topic of the session. The conversation ranged from water and food shortages/dumping food surplus in Africa to farming and agriculture practices, land pressures, and economic opportunities to intra-country and regional influencing and stability. The participants provided considerable anecdotal examples from their respective countries and experience.

In Democratic Republic of Congo there have been cases documented where neighboring countries support armed groups with the aim of destabilizing the country. This destabilization is intended to maintain an upper hand in the region as well as to have control over resources that are beyond their borders. As well, there is a [case](#) between the DRC and Uganda over looting of natural resources by Uganda.

Oil as the cause of conflict is well established in South Sudan. One aspect is that Sudan is agitated by South Sudan's possible plans for constructing an alternative pipeline for oil transportation, either through Kenya or through Ethiopia. This threatens the security and economic interest within South Sudan. It is commonly believed within South Sudan that Sudan wants South Sudan to remain weak and unstable thus to rely on Sudan to transport its oil. Yet, on the other hand, they do not want South Sudan to collapse to the level that oil production stops altogether. As well, in Sudan/South Sudan, governments have funded militia groups to quash violent insurgencies. In the early days of the Darfur conflict, the grievances likely could have been resolved around a negotiating table. Instead, the Sudanese government used funds to fragment the rebel groups. In Rwanda, stability is promoted within while funding instability at its border versus. The recent history of wars and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrated that governments are, in many circumstances, involved in the destabilization of neighboring countries. In Burundi and Rwanda, they accuse the other of supporting rebel movements to fight against the existing regimes. In Mozambique, this is an [example](#) of drawbacks to directly funding governments who do not practice transparency.

Government is only one option for providing support. Participants think there is value to also **better understand the needs on the ground before bringing financial support and consider transparency and governance indicators**. If transparency and governance are low, it is important to work in partnership with INGOs who can better manage and allocate funds and dutifully manage programs. Few funds go to local civil society, due to perceived inability to manage, or lack of a track record. The suggestion from a participant was to invest locally and build local capacity. Investments in rural areas, in infrastructure, agricultural industry, education, nutrition and social protection are key. This counteracts instability.

The environment should be under the protection of the government. However, wide spread deforestation for farming is driving people away from the region, as well as destroying the environment. It was stated that governments are allowing this for either short-term gain, without recognizing, or caring, of the longer-term impact on their country.

Export subsidies provided e.g. by European Governments lead to dumping prices for food commodities in many African countries. Driving prices down forces small holder farmers to compete. Loss of income in many cases leads to food insecurity. [Food insecurity](#) in turn is a driver of instability/conflict. Likewise, in respect to [water](#), incorporating water improvements into economic development is necessary to end the severe problems caused by water stress and to improve public health and advance the economic stability of the region.



[Conflict is usually marked](#) with the same characteristics: socioeconomic marginalisation of people, poverty and hunger, illiteracy, young populations, which in the absence of a response, were “fodder to extremism.” Traditional Government donors are beginning to bring the humanitarian and development nexus together. Thus, investing in and strengthening these core characteristics and supporting CSOs and transparent governments will help promote stability.

1.7. Religious groups fund instability

Radical religious groups, such as Boko Haram, can drive their agenda by funding instability. This benefits their efforts for recruitment by also providing purpose for would-be followers. Religious groups can use a sophisticated recruitment process to emotionally pull individuals into a follower base, solicit resources, and, while building community, also engrain beliefs that are counter to productive national or community development efforts. They can also spread hate for minority groups. For example, in Uganda there has been considerable targeting of LGBT communities by religious groups. And, although it might not appear like instability, religious group leadership, often male dominant, perpetuates patriarchal ideology with an impact on gender equality.

Religion is powerful in Africa and elected leaders can be driven by their beliefs which can provoke negative assumptions and dangerous stereotypes. For example, there is considerable antipathy and resistance towards contraceptives, which can be lifesaving, reduce population pressures, and reduce the spread of HIV and STIs. Some religious leaders engage in political issues and even participate in exacerbating conflicts within communities in which they work. And, religious groups can morally support instabilities by not denouncing the involvement of some of their followers who are active in conflicts, or by not directly and publicly condemning violence in their respective countries. In the case of Rwanda, there remain strong memories of the Catholic Church’s role in the genocide. Traditionally seen as a source of refuge, several massacres are documented as being fueled by the church leaders.

But, the participants also voiced that the notion that religious groups fund instability is too general. **Just as religious groups can support/foment instability, so too can they play a determinative role in helping to resolve conflict** and positive lead their country.

Inter-faith bodies are an important tool/platform for dialogue. They can be a very productive form of engagement where instability is tied to religious conflict. In Somalia, traditional Sufi moderate religious groups have come together to fight al-Shabaab. They mobilized primarily with local resources. It was noted that in the Galmadug region, they fought even without the support of external actors. The involvement or denouncement of conflict by the religious community has a big role to play—most African people see churches/mosques as sources of protection and solace when in trouble. Moderate and tolerant religious groups can actually help contribute to stability. Religious groups can be a viable conduit for stabilisation efforts.

1.8. Trafficking and cross-border criminality create instability in Africa

Illicit cash flows contribute to and connect criminality and instability. Whether narco-trafficking, ivory trade or human trafficking, armed groups often rely on these trades to fund their activities. More research around this "convergence" would be beneficial. It was noted by one participant, that human trafficking, not only transnational trafficking but internal trafficking as well, is both a manifestation of underlying socioeconomic instability and a perpetuator of instability. Social determinants of trafficking include poverty, orphan hood/lack of family structure, lack of education, and those living in conflict zones. Exploitation of another human has deeply negative consequences for the exploited, which in turn can spread to the community/national/and international level and foster instability.



1.9. The most rampant issue in many African countries, is the endemic corruption. Even in stable societies, it creates inability to invest, a real blockage to social promotion, and has severe effects on security and governance. In instable societies, corruption is often the norm, and both relief and development efforts are hampered by it. If IO's want to make meaningful contributions, we must focus on supporting local leadership that shows real commitment to transparency and good governance.

It is important to sanction the high-level government leaders. Often, when corruption is prosecuted it is the very low-level people who are punished. **If leaders and decision-makers are not held accountable, a corrupt system will continue.** The military is also an example of punishing low level people while promoting or ignoring the record of high level officers. Punishing militias without considering who sent them is another example. The participants were in agreement with the consequences for corruption, but sanctioning country leaders always has a negative impact on the population. Instead, education or training programmes on integrity and transparency, honesty and sincerity, as well as external conditioned, could be more impactful.

1.10. International organisations (NATO, European Union, United Nations, African Union) are in the right position to stop instability.

Most participants stated that international organisations (IO) are well positioned to stop instability. But, they need to work together and have better joint strategic plans on how they will create stability. IOs can stop instability when there is genuine commitment by opposing sides to cease hostility. However, it was strongly noted that **IOs cannot stop instability in the absence of commitment to peace by actors involved and if they do not have a holistic understanding of the context.** For example, one participant mentioned, how s/he can see some IOs mis-reading the situations in some African countries and creating more chaotic scenes.

IOs won't succeed single-handedly, without buy-in and support from national and local actors.

One recurrent challenge to resolving conflicts and addressing instability in a durable manner is the disconnect between high-level political processes (e.g. peace negotiations) and grassroots efforts. It was noted that IOs should ensure that information about high-level efforts reaches civil society and that the diverse citizen perspectives are genuinely integrated into the peace processes. Too often, IO's work in silos, or only cooperate with regional organisations and donors that may have conflicting interests to community and civil society needs. To achieve lasting impact, key IOs and regional and sub-regional actors can come together, centered around human security and clearly defined milestones for a pathway to stability. When IOs do not support stability, atrocities can quickly happen. For example, how the Rwanda genocide witnessed a lack of significant and concerted international intervention despite UN presence.